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PEOPLE V. PREWn'T

[Crim. No. 6444.

C.~,l

In Bank. June 19, 1959.]

. THE PEOPLE, Appellant, v. HENRY VICTOR PREWITT,
.
.
Respondent.
[1J Prohibition - Application of Rules - Criminal ProceedingsAccusatory Pleading.-If illegally obtained evidence is the sole
basis of an indictment or information, defendant is held with. out reasonable or probable cause; his lIlotion to set aside the
accusatory pleading should be granted by the court in which
he is arraigned on such pleading, and if the 1Il0tion is ituproperly denied an appellate court will grant prohibition to
halt proceedings under the accusatory pleading.
[2] Indictment and Information-Motion to Set Aside-GroundsEvidence Illegally Obtained.-Where evidence before the
magistrate bearing on the issue of illegality of a search and
seizure is in conflict or susceptible of conflicting inferences
or consists only of the testimony of prosecution witnesses,
the court in ruling on a motion to set aside the information
will frequently not be in a position to make II. final determination as to the admissibility of the evidence, and accordingly
the information should not be set aside on the ground that the
essential evidence was illegally obtaiued if there is any substantial evidence or applicable presumption to support a contrary conclusion, since in such eases the ultimate decision on
admissibility can be made at the trial on the basis of all evidence bearing on the issue.
[SJ. Oriminal Law-Preliminary Proceedings - Objections - Evidence.-The burden is on defendant to ..raise the issue of
illegally obtained evidence, and if the prosecution is by in.formation he must object to the introduction of the evidence
before the magistrate if he seeks to have it excluded as a basis
for holding him to answer.
[4J Indictment and Information-Objections-Time of Objection.
-When the prosecution is by indictment, defendant has no
opportunity to object to the introduction of evidence before

.

[2] Indictment based on evidence illegally procured, note, 24
A.L.R. 1432. See also Cal.Jur.2d, Indictment and Information,
§ 166.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Prohibition, § 44; [2,5,6,13] Indictment and Information, § 88(6); [3] Criminal Law, § 168; [4] Indictment and Information, § 84; [7] Arrest, § 5; Searches and
Seizures, § 19; [8-10, 14, 15] Witnesses, § 60; [11] Arrest, § 12;
Searches and Seizures, § 21; [12] Arrest, § 12; [16] CriminalI..aw,
§ 1018.
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the grand jury, and accordingly there can be no waiver of the
. right to challenge legality of the evidence to support the indictment based on failure to object to its introduction.
[5] . ld. - Motion to Set Aside-Grounds - Evidence ruegally
Obtained.-If the record is silent on the question whether
essential evidence for an indictment wns illegally obtained, it
must be presumed that the officers acted lawfully, in which
case the ultimate decision on admissibility can be made at
the trial on the basis of all evidence bearing on the issue.
[8] ld.-Motion to Set Aside-Grounds-Evidence ruegally Obtained.-If the evidence before the grand jury establishes as
a matter of law that essential evidence was illegally obtained
or otherwise inadmissible, a Illolion to set aside the indictment
should be granted.
[7] Arrest-Without Warrant: Searches and Seizures-Without
Warrant.-Where there was no direct testimony before the
grand jury that the officer" making the arrest and seizing the
evidence in a bookmaking case did not have a warrant, and
an officer testified that in making the arrest he was acting on
information received from an informer and the People do not
contend on appeal that the arrest should he sustained on the
ground that the existence of n warrant Illust be presumed, the
only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the evidence
is that the arrest, search and seizure were made without a
warrant.
[8] Witnesses - Privileged Communications - Public Officers.When the prosecution seeks to show reasonable cause for a
search by testimony as to comillunications from an informer,
known to the officer who received the information, either the
identity of the informer must be disclosed when defendant
seeks such disclosure or such testimony must be struck on
proper motion of defendant. This rule is based on the requirement that the officer fully disclose the information on
which he relics to enable the court to determine whether it
constitutes reasonable cause.
[9] ld.-Privileged Communications-Public Officers.-An officer's
belief in probable cause for an arrest must or should rest on
a substantial basis. It is not a question of impugning the
motives or doubting the honest belief of the officer or agent
in regard to information he may have received; it is simply
requiring the witness to sustain his 1Il0tives and his beliefs by
all the evidence at his command.
[10] ld.-Privileged Communications-Public Officers.-If an ofHcer docs nut kaow the [Jllllle uf :tn informer he does not sup[il] Sec Cal.Jur., Witll('s~es, § 31; Am.Jur., Witnesses, §§ 53:;,
[.36.

)
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press evidence by not stating it. Since no privilege is claimed,
the evidence of the information received cannot be excluded
on the ground that one is claimed.
.[11] Arrest-Without Warrant-Reasonable Cause: Searches and
Seizures-Reasonable Cause.-Evidence of information from 8.
reliable informer is sufficient to sustain a finding that an
arrest, search and seizure were made with reasonable cause.
[12] Id.-Without Warra.nt-Reasonable Cause.-Although information provided by an anonymous informer is relevant on the
issue of reasonable cause, in the absence of some pressing
emergency an arrest may not be based solely on such information, and evidence must be presented to the court that would
justify the conclusion that reliance on the information was
reasonable.
[13] Indictment and Information-Motion to Set Aside-Grounds
-Evidence IDegally Obtained.-An officer's testimony before
the grand jury in a bookmaking case that he received a telephone call from a person who told him that a back office operation was being carried on at a certain apartment and that he
recognized the voice of this person, who did not give his name,
as that of a person who had twice previously given him information that had proved accurate and resulted in arrests,
and that acting on this information, the source of which he
considered reliable, he went to the apartmcnt in question,
obtained a key from the manager's ollice, unlocked the door,
opened it about two inches, at which point It night latch prevented further progress, whereupon the officers forced the
latch, entered the apartment and found defendant amid various bookmaking equipment, which the officers seized, did not
establish that essential evidence was illegally obtained, and
accordingly the trial court erred in setting aside an indictment
charging defendant with bookmaking and with occupying an
apartment for the purpose of recording bets.
[14] Witnesses-Privileged Communications-Public Officers.-It
cannot be presumed that officers will commit perjury so as to
justify illegal arrests on the basis of fictitious information
from fictitious anonymous informers, and it must be presumed
that trial courts will be alert to detect perjury if it occurs.
[15] Id.-Privileged Communications-Public 'Officers.-Since the
privilege of nondisclosure of an informer must be waived
if the information is to be relied on to prove legality of an
arrest, the officer to wholU information was given by an informer whose identity was allegedly unknown to the officer
may be cross-examined fully as to facts that might tend to
identify the infonJler and test the officer's credibility. His
[12] See Cal.Jur.2d, Arrest, § 10; Am.Jur., Arrest, § 48.
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tpstimony is not linlited to gt'lleral l<tatements that on previous
occasions reliable information WIlS ginn, !lnd he cannot claim
a privilege that the details ,vould tend to identify the informer.
. [16]. Criminal Law - Judgment - Res Judica.ta..-Dismissal of an
information or indictment will not bar a trial based on a suhsequent accusatory pleading charging the identical offense.
(Pen. Code, § 999.) This rule specifically applies when the
previous dismissal was based on the magistrate's conclusion
that the evidence was illegally obtained; to relitigate the
question of admissibility of the evidence would not deny defendant due process of law.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County setting aside an indictment. Mark Brandler,
Judge. Order reversed; motion to augment the record, denied.
Edmund G. Brown and Stanley Mosk, Attorneys General,
William E. James, Assistant Attorney General, William B.
McKesson, District Attorney (Los Angeles), Jere J. Sullivan,
Lewis Watnick and Robert Lederman, Deputy District Attorneys, for Appellant.
Albert Jack Chotiner and Russell E. Parsons for Respondent.
A. L. Wirin and Paul P. Selvin as Amici Curiae on behalf
of Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-The People appeal from an order granting
defendant's motion to set aside an indictment charging defendant with bookmaking and with occupying an apartment
for the purpose of recording bets. (Pen. Code, § 337a.) Defendant has moved to augment the record to present additional grounds for affirming the order.
The grand jury returned the indictment after hearing the
following evidence: Officer Joseph Deiro testified that for the
past three years he had been assigned to the Administrative
Vice Division of the Los Angeles Police Department and during that time had made more than two hundred bookmaking
arrests. He said that he was familiar with the various ways
that bookmaking is carried on in Los Angeles.
A person wishing to make a small bet can place it with a
"hand book," who is likely to be found in the vicinity of a
bar or poolroom. One wishing to bet a larger sum can call an
"agent," who will give him a telephone number to call.
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The bettor then telephone::; in his bets daily and settles his
account with the agent about once a week.
No bookmaker can operate without a system of safely and
perinallently recording the bets, winnings, and losses. Therefore most bookmakers have one or more "front offices" or
"relay spots." At the front office a person answers the telephone and accepts bets placed by the" hand books" and larger
bettors. He records the bets on the top of a table, a slate, or
on anything that can be written on and erased or destroyed
easily, since front offices are often raided by the police.
The permanent records are kept in the" back office." Just
before post time of each race the back office calls the front
office and accepts all bets that have been received by the front
office. The bets are then recorded on professional betting
cards and the cards are placed in a rack. These cards contain, in code, the name of the bettor, the horse, the amount of
the bet, and the result of the race.
Some time in late January or early February of 1958,
Officer Deiro received a telephone call from a person who told
him that a back office operation was being carried on at 248
South Western Avenue in Apartment 401. This person did
not give his name, but Officer Deiro recognized his voice as
that of a person who had twice previously given him information that had proved accurate and resulted in arrests. Although Officer Deiro did not know and never had known the
name of this person, he considered his source of information
reliable.
On February 20, 1958, acting upon the information received
from the informer, Officer Deiro and two fellow officers went
to the address on South Western Avenue. Officer Deiro obtained a key to apartment 401 from the manager's office.
The officers slowly unlocked the door to the apartment and
opened it about two inches, at which point a night latch
prevented further progress. Nothing but a bare wall could
be observed through the opening. The officers then forced
the latch and entered the apartment. Defendant was standing
in the center of the room amid various bookmaking equipment.
The officers arrested him and seized the bookmaking paraphernalia. They found a key to the apartment in defendant's
pocket. Handwriting analysis indicated that defendant had
prepared a number of betting cards fOllnd ill a rack in the
apartment.
The foregoing evidence before the grand jury was sufficient to support the indictment unless it was illegally ob-
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tained. [1] "If ... illegally obtained evidence is the sole
basis or an indidment or information, defendant is held without reasonable or probable cause; his motion to set aside the
accusatory pleading should be granted by the court in which
he is arraigned on such pleading; and if the motioll is improperly denied an appellate court will grant prohibition to
halt proceedings under the accusatory pleading." (People v.
l'alenti,49 Ca1.2d 199, 203 [316 P.2d 633] ; see also Badillo v.
Superior COllrt, 46 Ca1.2d 269, 271 [294 P.2d 23] ; Priestly v.
Superior Court, 50 Ca1.2d 812,815 [330 P.2d 39].) [2] In the
Badillo case we pointed out that "No problem is presented
in applying this rule in cases involving searches and seizures
in which the facts bearing on the legality of the search or
seizure are undisputed and establish as a matter of law that
the evidence is or is not admissible. In many cases, however,
the evidence before the magistrate bearing on this issue may
be in conflict or susceptible of conflicting inferences or consist
only of the testimony of prosecution witnesses, and under
these circumstances the court in ruling on a motion to set
aside the information will frequently not be in a position to
make a final determination as to the admissibility of the evidence. Accordingly, the information should not be set aside
on the ground that essential evidence was illegally obtained
if there is any substantial evidence or applicable presumption
to support a contrary conclusion [citations], and in such cases
the ultimate decision on admissibility can be made at the trial
on the basis of all of the evidence bearing on the issue." (46
Ca1.2d at 271-272.) [3] The burden is on the defendant
to raise the issue of illegally obtained evidence, and if the
prosecution is by information, he must object to the introduction of the evidence before the magistrate if he seeks to have
it excluded as a basis for holding him to answer. (Robison v.
Supet'ior Court, 49 Ca1.2d ]86, 187 [316 P.2d 1].) [4] When
the prosecution is by indictment, however, the defendant has
no opportunity to object to the introduction of evidence before
the grand jury, and accordingly, there can be no waiver of the
right to challenge the legality of the evidence to support
the indictment based on a failure to object to its introduction.
[5] ,Although lie has 110 opportullit~, to dcvt'lop facts that
may show that essential evidence was illegally obtained, if the
record is silent on this question, it must be presumed that the
offieers aett'd lawfully. (Pfople v. 'fi'ar1'Q1'a, 46 Ca1.2d 265,
269 [294 P .2d 21].) III snch a case, just as in the case
when the evidence before t.he magistrate is (:onflicting 011 the

)
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question of legality or no objection is madc to thc cvidence
seized, "the ultimate decision on admissibility can be made at
the trial on the ba.~is of all of the evidence bearing on thc
issue~" (Badillo v. Superior Court, S1tpra.) [6] If, however,
the evidence before the grand jury establishes as a matter of
law that essential evidence was illegally obtained or otherwise
inadmissible, a motion to set the indictment aside should be
granted. (People v. Valenti, supra.) Defendant contends
that this is such a case and that the order should therefore
be affirmed.
[7] There was no direct testimony before the grand jury
that the officers did not have a warrant. Officer Deiro testified, however, that in making the arrest he was acting on the
information received from the informer and the People do
not contend that the arrest should be sustained on the ground
that the existence of a warrant must be presumed. Under these
circumstances the only reasonable inference that can be drawn
from the record is that the arrest, search, and seizure were
made without a warrant. Accordingly, the question presented
is whether information from an informer who has proved
reliable in the past constitutes probable cause for an arrest
when the officer does not know the identity of the informer.
[8] This question is distinct from that presented in
Priestly v. Superior Court, SO Ca1.2d 812 [330 P.2d 39]. In
that case the officer knew the identity of the informer but
claimed a privilege not to disclose it. It was held that in such
a ease "when the prosecution seeks to show reasonable cause
for a search by testimony as to communications from an informer, either the identity of the informer must be disclosed
when the defendant seeks disclosure or such testimony must
br. struck on proper motion of the defendant." (SO Ca1.2d at
~19.) This rule is based on the requirement that the officer
fully disclose the information on which he relies to enable the
court to determine whether it constitutes reasonable cause.
[9] "A belief must or should rest upon a substantial basis.
It is not a question of impugning the motives or douoting the
honest belief of the agent in regard to the information which
he may have received. It is simply requiring the witness to
sustain his motives and his beliefs by all the evidence at his
command." (United States v. Blich, 45 F.2d 627, 629.)
(Italics added.) [10] If the officer does not know the name
of the informer he does 110t suppress evidence by not stating
it. lIe is not seeking to eat his cake aud have it too; to rely
on information and yet not reveal it. Since no privilege is
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daimed, the evidence of the information received cannot be excluded on the ground that one is claimed. (See Willson v.
Superior COUI·t, 46 Ca1.2d 291, 295, footnote [294 P.2d 36].)
The question remains whether the information should neverthE' less be held insufficient to constitute reasonable cause.
[111 Evidence of information from a reliable informer ill
sufficient to sustain a finding that an arrest, search, and seizure
were made with reasonable cause. (Willson v. Superior Court,
46 Ca1.2d 291, 294-295 [294 P.2d 36] ; People v. Boyles, 45
Ca1.2d 652,656 [290 P.2d 535] ; People v. Dupee, 151 Cal.App.
2d 364, 367 [311 P.2d 568] ; People v. Dean, 151 Cal.App.2d
165, 167 [311 P.2d 85] ; Lorenzen v. Superior Court, 150 Cal.
App.2d 506, 513 [310 P.2d 180]; Trowbridge v. Superior
Court, 144 Cal.App.2d 13, 18 [300 P.2d 222] ; see 9 Stan. L.
Re,\". 515, 523-524.) [12] "Although information provided
by an anonymous informer is relevant on the issue of reasonable cause, in the absence of some pressing emergency [citation], an arrest may not be based solely on such information
[citations], and evidence must be presented to the court that
would justify the conclusion that reliance on the information
was reasonable. [Citation.] In some cases the identity of, or
past experience with, the informer may provide such evidence
[citation],- and in others it may be supplied by similar information from other sources or by the personal observations
of the police." ( Willson v. Superior Court, 46 Ca1.2d 291, 294295 [294 P .2d 36].) In the Willson case, as in this case, the
informer did not identify himself to the officer, but we held
that his information together with facts personally observed
by the officer were sufficient to constitute reasonable cause for
an arrest. Admittedly, an informer's failure or refusal to
identify himself may cast doubt on the reliability of his information, but the fact that his information has proved reliable
in the past is at least as persuasive of his present reliability as
'the corroborating suspicious circumstances observed by thn
officer in the Willson case; circumstances that alone were
lIot sufficient to constitute reasonable causl". [13] The testimony before the grand jury does not establish that ~<;sential
evidence was illegally obtained, and accordingly, the trial
court erred in setting aside the indictment.
[14] Defendant contends, however, that if reasonable
cause may be established by information from an informer
whose identity is unknown to the officer, the rule of the
-Footnote omitted.
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Priestly case may be circumventeu by the officer's claiming
ignorance instead of privilege and the door will be opened
to justify illegal arrests on the basis of fictitious information
from fictitiolls anonymous informers, It caunot be presumed,
bowc\,eJ;, that officers will commit perjury (Lorellzen v. Superior Court, 150 Cal.App.2d 506, 510 [310 P.2d 180]), and it
must be presumed that trial courts will be alert to detect perjury if it does occur. (See People v. Roberts, 47 Ca1.2d 374,
378 [303 P.2d 721].) [15] Moreover, since the privilege
of nondisclosure must be waived if the information is to be
relied upon, the officer may be cross-examined fully as to
facts that might tend to identify the informer and' test the
officer's credibility. His testimony is not limited to general
statements that on previous occasions reliable information was
given, and he cannot claim a privilege that the details would
tend to identify the informer. His testimony can be elicited
as to all of the details of the information claimed to have
been received, and the officer must relate that information to
actual arrests or investigations made in claimed reliance on it.
Not only would it be difficult to fabricate such details, but
since they must be related to actual facts, avenues of investigation to refute them may be opened. In the present case,
for example, Officer Deiro testified with respect to previous
information supplied by his informer as follows:
"Some time in the latter part of 1956, approximately November or December, I received the first phone call from this
person who at that time stated, he gave me a telephone number and told me that bookmaking was being conducted at that
telephone number and that it was a 'back office.' ...
"It [the telephone number] was checked out through the
telephone company and it was registered at 229 North New
H~mpshire Avenue. An investigation was conducted after
this information was received, and surveillance disclosed that
two known bookmakers, whom I had arrested before, were
entering this location in the morning and leaving in the evening. Our investigation was conducted for approximately two
weeks at which time we made an arrest. This particular case
wcnt to trial; the individuals were held to answer, the case
was dismissed on a 995 motion, and later on the District
Attorney's office appealed it, and I have received a subpoena
this week to testify in Superior Court iu regards to this
particular case. "
In People v. Cicchello, ]57 Cal.App.2d 158 [320 P.2d 528],
t.he District Court of Appeal reversE'd all ordE'r granting a
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motion to set. aside an information dlargiug Imoklllakiug at
229 North New Hampshire. We have found 110 olher appellate opinion filed between the latter part of 1956 and the date
Officer Deiro testified in this case involving that address.
. From the opinion it appears that the arrests were made by
. Officers Evans and Deiro in February 1957, and that the
investigation was undertaken on the basis of information
supplied to Officer Evans who in turn passed it on to Officer
Deiro. From the record in that case it appears that Officer
Deiro was asked at the preliminary hearing whether "Prior
to making this arrest, had you received any information from
a confidential informant regarding the defendants in this
caser" He answered, "Myself, personally, no, sir." When
the present case goes to trial Officer Deiro may be cross-examined as to whether the arrest he testified to before the grand
jury was the same arrest described in the Cicchello ('ase, and if
so, he may be asked to explain the discrepancy in his testimony
on the two occasions. Of course, if he did not personally
converse with the informer on the previous occasions referred
to, he would have no basis for concluding that the informer
in the present case was the same informer who had proved
reliable in the past, for it was solely by the sound of the
informer's voice that Officer Deiro identified him. These
possible discrepancies were not before the grand jury, ho\vever, and Officer Deiro has had no opportunity to explain them.
Defendant moved to augment the record on appeal by
adding thereto the minutes of the Municipal Court of the Los
Angeles Judicial District in case Number 143900, entitled
People v. Henry Victor Prewitt, and a certified copy of the
complaint filed in that court on March 3, 1958, wherein defendant was accused of violating section 337a of the Penal
Code. In support of the motion defendant has filed an affidavit
of one of his counsel that the defendant named in the municipal
eourt action is the defendant in the present case; that the
charge contained in the indietment in the instant case is
identical with the charge contained in the complaint filed in
the municipal court; and that after a preliminary examination
at which substantially the same evidence was presented to the
magistrate as was presented to the grand jury, "said case
was dismissed by reason of the fact that the evidence had
been unlawfully obtained, in violation of the rules laid down
in tIle case of People v. Cahan, 44 CIl1.2d 434 [282 P.2d 905,
50 A.L.R.2d 513]."
[16] Def"lldant contends that the doL'trines of res judi-
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cata and collateral estoppel arc applicable to establish that
the evidence in the present case was unlawfully obtained. The
dismissal of an information or indictment, however, will not
bar a trial based on a subsequent accusatory pleading charging
the identical offense. (Pen. Code, § 999; Ex Parte Fenton,
77 Cal. 183 [19 P. 267] ; People v. Joseph, 153 Cal.App.2d
548 [314 P.2d 1004] ; see also In re Begerow, 136 Cal. 293,
298-300 [68 P. 773, 56 L.R.A. 528] ; People v. Beltran, 94 Cal.
App.2d 197, 203-205 [210 P.2d 238].) This rule specifically
applies when the previous dismissal was based on the magistrate's conclusion that the evidence was illegally obiained.
(People v. Joseph, supra, 153 Cal.App.2d 548; see also
Badillo v. 8upe,.wr Court, 46 Ca1.2d 269, 272-273, footnote
[294 P.2d 23].) There is no merit in defendant's assertion
that to relitigate the question of the admissibility of the evidence denies him due process of law. (People v. Ferrera, 149
Cal.App.2d 850, 852 [309 P.2d 533].)
The motion to augment the record is denied. The order
setting aside the indictment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., McComb, J., and Peters, J., concurred.
Shenk, J., and Spence, J., concurred in the judgment.
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